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V.: License--Licensor-s Liability to Licensee--Duty on Railroad Compa
WE7ST VI.GINIA LAW QUA.TERLY

regard to chattels, there must be an actual delivery of possession.
or a deed of gift. Barnes v. Banks, 223 Ill. 352; Ross v. Milne,
12 Leigh 204 (Va.); Connor v. Trauwick, 37 Ala. 289. The
same rule applies to gifts of choses in action represented by a
specialty; and the delivery of such specialty must amount to a
transfer of all the donor's control or dominion over the subject.
In some cases where actual delivery of a chattel cannot be made,
resort may be had to what has been called a symbolical delivery.
White v. Kilgore, 77 Me. 571. A chose in action not represented
by a specialty cannot be physically transferred. It has been
held, therefore, that such a chose in action cannot be given away
irrevocably. Cook v. Lum, 55 N. J. L. 373.
However, anequitable chose in action, which is just as intangible, and delivery
of which is just as impossible, may be given away without any
formalities other than an expression of intent. Harding v. Harding, 17 Q. B. D. 442; Wilt v. Hoffman, 46 W. Va. 473, 33 S. E.
279. There seems to be no good reason for the distinction which
exists between legal and equitable choses in action. The principal
case is concerned with a legal chose, and is in accord with the settled law, but it would seem that such decision might be argued to,
be wrong on principle.
-A. W. L.
LICENSE-LICENSOR'S LIABILITY TO LICENSEE-DUTY ON RhAUi,-

CoPANY.-Plaintiff, an adult, not in the employ of the
railroad company, was struck by a backing train and killed,
while using a railroad track as a footpath for his own convenience elsewhere than at a public crossing. Two problems:
were presented. First, whether the railroad company had any
duty to look out for the plaintiff. Second, whether the railroad
company owed a duty after perceiving the plaintiff to do more
than refrain from the infliction of wanton or wilful injury.
Held, there was no duty to look out for plaintiff, but afterhe was discovered there was a duty on the defendant to use reasonable care to avoid injuring him. Robertson v. Coal & Coke
R. Co., 104 S. E. 615 (W. Va. 1920).
ROAD

It is settled that the owner is under no duty to a bare licensee
to keep the premises in safe condition. Plummer v. Dul, 156
Mass. 426, 31 N. E. 128. There is no commonly accepted rule
in this country as to the duty of a railroad company to keep a
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lookout for persons or animals on the track. The better view
is that there is a duty to keep a lookout, but that such duty ia
subsidiary to the paramount duty to protect the passengers and
property in the train, and the train itself. The Cincinnati &
Zanesville RR. Co. v. Smith, 22 Oh. St. 227; Bemis v. Connecticut & Paussumpsic RR. Co., 42 Vt. 375. The West Virginia
court has consistently held that there is a duty on those in
charge of the train to keep a reasonable lookout for animals and
persons trespassing on the tracks. Gunn v. Ohio River Rk.
Co., 42 W. Va. 676, 26 S. E. 546; Stuck v. Kanawha & Michigan
R. Co., 76 W. Va. 453, 86 S. E. 13. The principal case seems
on this point, therefore, inconsistent with the better view, and
irreconcilable with those West Virginia cases that hold there is
a duty to keep a lookout. As to the second point, there are two
views as to what duty is owed to a licensee after he has been
perceived. The Massachusetts rule is that the only duty owedl
a licensee is to avoid the infliction of wanton and reckless injury.
Maynard v. Boston & Maine RR., 115 Mass. 458. The rule that
a railroad company must, with the facilities at hand, and under
the circumstances as they exist at the time, exercise reasonable
care to avoid injury is followed in Virginia. Washington, &
Old Doniinion R. Co. v. Ward's Admr., 119 Va. 334, 89 S. E.
140; Shiveley's Admr. v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 125 Va.
384, 99 S. E. 650. The barbaric Massachusetts doctrine was
followed in prior decisions of the West Virginia court. Woolwine's Admr. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 36 W. Va. 329, 10 S.
E. 81; Spicer v. Ch~esapeake & Ohio R. Co., 34 W. Va. 514, 12
S. E. 553; Blagg v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 83 W. Va. 449, 98
S. E. 526. The principal case, although it makes conflicting
statements in the body of the opinion, clearly adopts in its
syllabus the more humane rule of Virginia.
-M. T. V.
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